Lori Ann Busche v. Matthias Busche : Cross-Appellant\u27s Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Lori Ann Busche v. Matthias Busche : Cross-
Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rosemond G. Blakelock; Andrew F. Peterson; Blakelock and Peterson; Attorneys for Respondent/
Appellant.
Douglas B. Thayer; Andrew V. Wright; Hill Johnson and Schumtz, L.C.; Attorneys for Petitioner/
Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Lori Ann Busche v. Matthias Busche, No. 20080388 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/881
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 







App. Case No.: 20080388 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Rosemond G. Blakelock (6183) 
Andrew F. Peterson (10074) 
BLAKELOCK & PETERSON 
1832 North 1120 West 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant 
Douglas B.Thayer (8109) 
Andrew V.Wright (11071) 
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
River View Plaza, Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84604-5663 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC 2 8 2010 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LORI ANN BUSCHE, 
Petitioner/Cross-Appellant 
vs. 




App. Case No.: 20080388 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Rosemond G. Blakelock (6183) 
Andrew F. Peterson (10074) 
BLAKELOCK & PETERSON 
1832 North 1120 West 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant 
Douglas B.Thayer (8109) 
Andrew V.Wright (11071) 
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
River View Plaza, Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84604-5663 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court erred by relying on this unsupported statement to determine that Lori's fees were 
one fifth of Matthias5. The trial court also erred by relying on its determination that 
Lori's fees were one fifth of Matthias' to conclude that Lori's fees were excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Lori respectfully requests that this Court find that the trial court 
erred in refusing to consider Matthias' equity in the marital home in its determination of 
his ability to pay Lori's attorney fees. Also, Lori requests that this Court find that the 
trial court erred in determining the award of attorney fees. 
STATEMENT CONCERNING ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(A)(11), Lori states that no addendum is necessary. 
DATED this 21 day of December, 2010. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Douglas B / T ^ V — 
Andrew J^fwright \ 
Counsel for Lori Busche 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Despite Matthias' arguments to the contrary, the trial court erred in failing to o 
award Lori all her attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting and defending against Matthias' 
petition to modify. The court found that Lori was the prevailing party, that she had a 
need for the fees and that Matthias was able to pay. However, the court arbitrarily 
determined that Lori's requested fees were unreasonable. 
The trial court's determinations on this issue are in error based on the following 
grounds: First, the trial court erred as a matter of law that Matthias' equity and interest in 
the marital home could not be considered by the court in determining attorneys fees. . 
Second, the trial court erred as a matter of law in relying on an unsupported statement 
made by Matthias' counsel that Matthias' attorneys fees were a fifth of Lori's. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT FOR PURPOSES OF 
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES, A PARTY'S EQUITY OR INTEREST IN 
A HOME OR PROPERTY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ASSETS OR 
INCOME. 
Contrary to Matthias' assertions, the trial court did find, as a matter of law, that 
Matthias' equity in the marital home could not be considered an asset or income for the 
purpose of determining Matthias' ability to pay Lori's attorney fees. The trial court 
found "that [Matthias'] equity in the marital home [was] not ongoing income and . . . that 
it [was] not appropriate to take the $66,000 in equity . . . for . . . payment of [Lori's] 
l 
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attorney fees. So I am not going to consider^Respondent's equity in the marital home." 
(Findings of Fact and Am, Decree of Divo£ce,^| 77; R. at 0996]. This was errors Ai trial 
court is ^ t Hmit^^ ineop^iinvite^ of Simony or aparty'sr^ility,, 
to pay attorney fees, -.^ .t "••';; :-v-::'--,v':.5^ i;':;rj?: •••"••: ' ^ " ^\* Lu^c-:;!i- '^.'y-$*- • : • -' n-..- ' r 
In?€rompton v;Q'oiripton1k£l3tah Court of Appeals explained ^ that sources of • w 
income vary from one marital arrangement to^another. 888 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah-App. 
1994). Therefore, "it would be inappropriate for an appellate court to tie the hands of a 
trial court: by confining its consideration of income in every, case to only that which 
springs from a forty-hour-week source." Id. Rather, "[a] trial court must be able to 
consider all sources of income that were used by the parties during their marriage to meet 
their self-defined needs, from whatever source—overtime, second job, self-employment, 
etc., as well as unearned income." Id. (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals has approved the consideration of 
welfare, unemployment, disability benefits', assistance, from friends and'church, Wilde v. 
• . '/ >. 
Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, 347 (Utah App. 2001), retirement benefits and "unearned" 
investment income, Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880-82 (Utah App. 1995), and 
"historical earnings," and imputed "unemployed" or "underemployed" income, Moon v. 
•\}ijrj l>r^! .Xi •"./• .••••;v:"T'r-?-J .'•' ' W-^rr': y M ^ ' a ^ M < - ' "" ' : ny/^L ' ^ '/..p.:;':i 
Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 438 n.8 (Utah App. 1999), in awarding alimony. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has also approved the consideration of a party's equity 
in a home in determinations of alimony and a party's ability to pay attorney fees. For 
2 
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example, in Adelman v. Adelman, the court affirmed the trial court's order offsetting a 
party's equity in the marital home by the judgment against the party for back alimony. 
815 P.2d 741, 746 (Utah App. 1991). And in an unpublished opinion, the court approved 
the trial court's consideration of a husband's equity in a home in the trial court's 
determination that the husband had the ability to pay the wife's attorney fees. Mads en v. 
Madsen, 1998 WL 1758391, *2. ' 
In sum, Utah appellate decisions have held that it is appropriate for a trial court to 
consider a party's equity in a home in the trial court's determination of alimony or a 
party's ability to pay the other party's attorney fees. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
finding that, as a matter of law, it could not consider Matthias' equity in the marital home 
in its determination of Matthias' ability to pay Lori's attorney fees. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT THE AMOUNT OF 
LORI'S ATTORNEY FEES WAS UNREASONABLE. 
The trial court has broad .discretion in determining whether to award attorney fees 
and the amount of the award. See Olieken v. Olieken, 147 P.3d 464, 468 (Utah App. 
2006) (citing Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App. 1988)). The trial 
court "may award considerably less than requested so long as the reduction is supported 
by adequate findings." Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Sporl, 2000 UT App. 195, *3. In 
this case, the trial court erred by awarding Lori considerably less than requested without 
supporting its reduction by adequate findings. 
3 
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In Madsen, the wife requested:$3,900 in attorney fees. 1998 WL 1758391, *2. 
Her attorney's testimony explained why $3,900 "was reasonable.^ B£sed,pn that testimony 
and the husband's equity in the home, the trial court ordered the husband to pay $2,000 in, 
attorney fees/ Id. Mm ¥ tah^©i^of d^ppeals rdtnandg# for^appropriate-fin dings arid' 
adjustment of the attorney fees award "because the trial court failed to explain its, ,, 
reduction in the amount of fees requested, and did not specify in its findings why $2,000;t / 
was reasonable." Id, at *2-3. 
In Rappleyey. Rappleye, the Utah Court of Appeals reiterated the factors a court 
may consider in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees: 
[a] court may consider: among other factors, the difficulty of the litigation, 
the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of 
the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services, the amount involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. 
855 P.2d 260, 265 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). The court explained that "[t]he 
court abuses its discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees] requested 
unless the reduction is warranted by one or more of [these] factors." Id. at 266 (citations 
omitted). Therefore, "the trial court must. . . identify such factors on the record and also 
explain its sua sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful review on appeal." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
In Rappleye, the wife requested $15,640 in attorney fees. Id. The trial court 
awarded $5,000. Id. The trial court found that the wife's attorney's hourly rate was 
4 
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reasonable but that there was insufficient evidence in the record to allow the court "to 
determine whether the number of hours spent on the case was reasonable. Id. The Utah 
Court of Appeals found that these findings were "insufficient to support the trial court's 
sua sponte reduction of the amount of attorney fees awarded to [the wife]." Id. The court 
explained: 
While the trial court apparently found that the testimony and supporting 
affidavit of [the wife's] attorney were insufficient to establish the 
reasonableness of the full amount of requested fees, it articulated no 
reasonable basis for its ultimate award of $5000. Because the court5s 
findings fail to demonstrate that the $5000 award was arrived at after 
proper consideration of the relevant factors for determining the 
reasonableness of attorney fee awards, such award constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
Id. Accordingly, the court vacated the trial court's award of attorney fees to the wife and 
remanded the matter to the trial court for further findings regarding the reasonableness of 
the award. Id. 
In this case, the trial court likewise failed to demonstrate that it arrived at the 
reduced $20,000 award after considering the relevant factors for determining the 
reasonableness of attorney fee awards. Like the trial court in Rappleye, the trial court in 
this case made some findings as to the reasonableness of the requested award, (Findings 
of Fact and Am. Decree of Divorce, % 74; (R. at 0997-0996), but articulated no basis for 
its ultimate award of $20,000. The trial court erred by failing to make any findings 
5 
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regarding^ reasonableness, of its $20,000 award. Therefore, the award of attorney fees 
should be remanded for further findings regarding the reasonableness of the award. , ' 
m . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT MATTHIAS' A .. 
ATTORNEY FEES WERE ONE FIFTH OF LORI'S BASED ON A 
f STATEMENT MADE BY COUNSEL, WHIGH-WAS UNSUPPORTED BY 
ANY EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
The party requesting attorney fees has the burden to present evidence to support 
the requested.,award. See Hqumont v. Haumont, 793.P.2& 421, 425 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citations omitted) (stating that "(t]o recover attorney fees in a divorce action, the moving 
party must show evidence (1) establishing the financial need of the requesting party, and 
(2) demonstrating the reasonableness of the amount of the award). The opposing party 
must then "offer . . . evidence to rebut [the moving party's] showing and thereby support 
an award for less than the amount. .... requested." Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 
893 (Utah 1996). ' ~'\ "jl/ / 
In?this case, Lori presented evidence, through her counsel's affidavit, that the' 
requested attorneyjfj^'were^ Ma11^as•:^ d•not•••off6r•al^ ;,>, ! -
evidenceto rebut Lori's evidence. Matthias' attorney represented that his fees were one-
fifth of Lori's.; This statement was unsupported by any evidence presented at-trial. . , 
Nevertheless,ffk^Mdiii0.qx^{Q\md, based upon MatMa;s^:attornfy5s representation, "that* 
the sum oflM%^^]&tt°mQy's&zs> fr°m ^ of his attorneys . . , was a fifth of 
[Lori's]." (Findings of Fact and Am. Decree of Divorce, ^ 16; R. at 0997.) The trial 
6 
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court erred by relying on this unsupported statement to determine that Lori's fees were 
one fifth of Matthias'. The trial court also erred by relying on its determination that 
Lori's fees were one fifth of Matthias' to conclude that Lori's fees were excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Lori respectfully requests that this Court find that the trial court 
erred in refusing to consider Matthias' equity in the marital home in its determination of 
his ability to pay Lori's attorney fees. Also, Lori requests that this Court find that the 
trial court erred in determining the award of attorney fees. 
STATEMENT CONCERNING ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(A)(11), Lori states that no addendum is necessary. 
DATED this 2^.day of December, 2010. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Douglas ^/l\^£^-\^ 
Andrew j^fwright \ 
Counsel for Lori Busche 
7 
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